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IV.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEANNA FOXLEY

:
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE
TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY
Defendant/Appellant

:

Case No. 890493-CA

:

Appeal from the Third
Judicial District Court

:
Hon. Richard H. Moffat

IN RESPONSE to Respondent's Brief, Appellant would make the
following Arguments.

DISPUTED FACTS

A.

Appellant admits the parties were married for seven (7)

years.
The Appellant's

statement in his Brief was that the

parties lived together for five and one-half (5 1/2) years before
separating.

B.

Respondent voluntarily did not increase her work.
Respondent argues form over substance of the evidence

at trial.

The representation of the dialogue by Respondent is
1

accurate.
C.

Appellant's income is disputed.
1.

Both parties are in disagreement over Appellant's

1987 income.
Because both parties are using the? same document,
i.e. Appellant's 1987 income tax return.

The actual income after

deduction for business expenses is $72,166.
The issue is what figure should be used to plug
into the Uniform Child Support Schedule for Appellant's income.
Appellant would argue that a figure that nets out
reasonable and ordinary business expenses is the one that should
be used.

2.

Trial of this matter commenced in September, 1988

and concluded in March of 1989.
At the time of trial, Appellant's accountant had
not completed

his income tax returns for 1988 nor was it due

(TR2:12-15) .

Respondent

tries to imply that Appellant

was

attempting to hide his income which is not the case.
The Court

found

that Appellant's income was as

high as $224,000.00 per year.
Appellant would assert that this figure was pulled
out of thin air.
Respondent's references to Appellants income are
made from self imposed deductions which are in conflict with the
express testimony of Dr. Foxley and the record.
2

Respondent states that Dr. Foxley earned $112,358
from his Winslow practice and cites (TR2/106:12-15).
When page 106 of TR2 is read, it is clear that he
earned $90,000.00 from the Winslow practice.
The income figures in the Findings of Fact have no
basis.
D.

Respondent

testified

that he would

shortly

pay

$75,000.00 per year for liability insurance (TR107:18-19) and
represented in his brief that the $75,000.00 was an estimate.
Appellant cannot see Respondent's point but would argue
that his testimony that his insurance carrier, Mutual Insurance
Company of Arizona, was significantly
insurance

increasing

liability

for an Obstetrician should not come as a great

surprise, and is properly included as evidence of Dr. Foxley!s
ability to pay.
Liability insurance should be properly be deducted from
gross earnings as a business expense.

II
ADDITIONAL FACTS
The additional facts added to Respondent's Brief were
part of Respondent's testimony concerning pre-divorce issues.
The pre-divorce items were admitted over Appellant's objection.
The Respondent uses net figures on tax returns 19831986 but for 1987 goes to a gross figure, without business
deductions.

Again, this is inaccurate and inconsistent with the
3

approach used for the other years.

The 1987 figure should be

$72,166.

Ill
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S RESPONSE
A.

Pre-Divorce issues should have been excluded and not

made part of the Findings.
The trial

court ruled that it would not rely on the

doctrine of equitable restitution, therefore, pre-divorce issues
should not have been considered or made part of the Findings.

B.

The increase of alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per

month should be reversed.
Due
establishment

to
of

the

short

a yearly

marriage
income

of

level

the

parties,

for Respondent

the
of

$45,456.00 was an abuse of discretion, not in line with Utah case
law of the reasons for alimony, and a windfall to Respondent of
$21,456.00 per year over the income needed to meet her expenses.
The award of alimony in the amount of $16,200 per year
is an abuse of discretion not supported by the evidence.

C.

The trial court's Findings are not supported by the

evidence.
The Respondent has not been accurate in the designation
of Appellant's 1987 income.
was used

to establish

It is the 1987 income figure that

the estimates
4

for Appellant's

future

earnings, which are also in error.
Using the same method as Respondent used to calculate
Appellant's income from 1983 through 1986, Appellant should have
income for 1988 of $72,166.00
The figures used by the Respondent and the Court in
establishing the figure of $6,985.00 per month used as the basis
of Appellant's child support obligations are nowhere to be found
in the record.
The child support award should be reversed.

D.

The Court

committed

reversible error in awarding an

increase of child support to $1,547.00 per month increasing to
$1,638.00 per month.
The child

support

worksheet

is hearsay under

Rule

801(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and not excepted by
Rules 802 and 901.
Because a proper foundation was not laid to introduce
the worksheet and because the worksheet was hearsay introduced
and submitted after the trial of this matter, the Court should
reverse the award of the District Court which predicated child
support on this worksheet.
At
$1,044.00

the

per

minimum,

month

child

based

on

Appellant.

5

support
the

should

worksheet

be set

at

submitted

by

E.

The Court erred in not giving Appellant's Motion for

Directed Verdict.

F.

The

Court

committed

reversible

error

in

awarding

respondent attorney's fees.
Respondent

argues

that a District

Court

can

take

judicial notice of the amount of attorney's fees it awards to a
party which were submitted

ten

(10) days after the close of

trial.
Article II Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence outlines
the requisites for judicial notice.
Because of the nature of attorney's fees and because
the record does not support

the Respondent's notion that the

Court took judicial notice, the argument of Respondent must fail
and attorney's fees must be reversed.

G.

The Court should have found Respondent in contempt of

court and either dismissed her case or awarded Appellant a new
trial.
After the trial Appellant presented new evidence to the
trial that the Respondent had committed perjury.
These accusations included the fact that the Respondent
had purchased an interest in an airplane for $4,500.00 when she
told

the Court

at

trial

she

could

property taxes.

6

not pay her mortgage

or

The

evidence

also

includes

allegations

of an

undisclosed bank account, $19,000.00 expenditures to fix up her
home and the purchase of a new home.
The Court dismissed Appellantfs motion without further
evidentiary hearing or inquiry.
Most of these allegations are not denied but Respondent
argues they are harmless error.
Appellant argues that it was reversible error not to
dismiss Respondent's petition or grant him a new trial.

H.

Judge Moffat should have been recused for allegations

of prejudice in an affidavit submitted by Appellant.

IV
ARGUMENT

A.

Pre-Divorce Issues should have been excluded.

The Court ruled from the onset of the hearing that it
would not use the elements stated in Martinez v. Martinez, 754
P2d 69 (Utah App 1988).
Because of this ruling a full evidentiary hearing on
pre-divorce matter was avoided including evidence that Mrs.
Foxley had attempted

to get Dr. Foxley kicked out of medical

school preferred by Appellant but rejected by the Court.

7

Appellant argues that the trial courtfs mind-set was to
award the Respondent equitable restitution and to legitimize that
award under

the broad discretion of change of

circumstances

analysis.
The

initial

draft

of factual

findings contained a

plethora of pre-divorce factual matters.
Although amended, they still include pre-divorce facts
which

are not

harmless

error, but a basis

for

the

alimony

increase, which is an abuse of discretion.

B.

Increase of alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month

should be reversed.

1.

Respondent has erred on page 8 of her Brief.
The original

decree did not provide the language as

emphasized.
This language was replaced and signed by Judge Conder
(see original Decree of Divorce in the record).

2.

Respondent

in her response merges child support and

alimony issues.

The point that is made by Appellant and not addressed
by Respondent is that the evidence does not support the level of
alimony and child support set by the Court.

8

The Court found that Respondent makes about $9,600.00
per year
and

(Finding 22), awarded her alimony of $16,200 per year

child

support

of

$19,656

for a yearly

income

level

of

$45,456.00,
Nowhere

is there a finding as to what she actually

needs in terms of dollars and cents that corresponds to the award
given.

No figure was presented nor was there sufficient evidence

presented for the Court to deduce such a figure.
The Respondent's

testimony was that she would spend

$2,000.00 per month at a desired standard of living (TR2/80:11),
leaving a windfall of $21,456.00.
This figure does not take into consideration that she
is only working part-time, that she has her bachelor's degree and
was to receive her Master's Degree in sociology in May of 1989.
Appellant

recognizes

that

alimony

is more

than a

mechanical award of dollars, but in turn, argues that such an
award must be consistent with evidence offered and the purposes
of alimony as enumerated by the Utah Supreme Court.
Currently

there are three branches of alimony under

Utah law.
The first line of cases attempts to maintain the wife
at a standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage,
English v. English, 565 P2nd 409 (Utah 1977).
Clearly

the parties were in a financially depressed

state and this criteria is inappropriate.

9

The second

line of cases

equitable restitution, Martinez

is the emerging

area

of

(supra), which the trial court

ruled would not be considered.
The third line is to rehabilitate the spouse so as not
to become a public charge, English (supra), Gramme v. Gramme 587
P2d 144 (Utah 1978), and in the case of long term marriage, some
permanent award Jones v. Jones 700 P2d 1072 (Utah 1985), Olson v.
Olson 704 P2d 564 (Utah 1985).
The marriage of the Foxleys, unlike case authority
cited by Respondent, is a very short one.

The parties lived

together for only 5 1/2 years and were divorced after 7 years.
Further, the Respondent

testified that she pulled herself off

welfare in 1984, earned a Bachelor!s Degree in 1984, would earn a
Master's Degree in May, 1989.

She lost her pctrt-time job and

refused to increase her hours at her other part-time job.
Appellant

does not argue

presented that she has needs.

that

Respondent

has

not

The Court on the other hand should

not supplement Mrs. Foxley because she chooses to buy an interest
in an airplane

for $4,500.00

instead of paying her mortgage,

property taxes and buying milk for the children.
Absent

proper

pleadings

and

evidence

that

she

is

entitled to equitable restitution or some other form of relief
which should have been presented at the initial trial in 1983,
the Court abuses its discretion to set a standard of living which
now allocates the Appellant's 1989 income without any basis and
which is $21,000.00 over her required standard of living.
10

This court

should

reverse

the alimony

award to

Respondent or at the minimum have the trial court set the level
of

need

in terms

of dollars

and

cents

consistent

with

Respondent's testimony of need and prospective future earnings.

C.

The trial court's findings are not supported by the

evidence.

1.

Respondent

is inconsistent and inaccurate in income

figures she presents in her Brief which is the basis for
Appellantfs numerous foundational objections.
For example, on page 3 of her Brief, Respondent
represents that Appellant earned $112,358.
The accurate figure is correctly represented on page 25
of her brief at $90,000.00.
The point is that Respondent submitted a child support
schedule after her case was closed without foundation based on
inaccurate figures that she still uses in her brief, and which
have absolutely no foundation in the record.

2.

Finding No. 17 is still without foundation or support

in the record.
The $112,000.00 figure for 1987 was a gross figure
before deduction for business expenses which was Respondent's
trial exhibit No. 7.

11

Clearly on Schedule C, it shows that Appellant incurred
business expenses, insurance, office expenses, etc., leaving him
actual

income of $56,087.00 plus $16,031.00

for a total of

$72,166.00.
The trial
gross

court

figure without

apparently

doubled

the

any questions being asked

$112,000.00
to establish

Appellant's income for 1988.
The Respondent then did not compute or place into the
record business expenses that should be discounted.
It is not

equitable

to peg Appellant's

income at a

gross figure that does not deduct his normal business expenses
for office help, insurance, etc.

3.

Finding No. 21 - Child Support Schedule.
Where

is the figure of $6,985.00 per month as the

Defendant's adjusted gross income in the record?
are

there

any

figures

in

the

record

that

It is not, nor

could

be

added,

subtracted, multiplied or divided to arrive at that figure.
Where is the deduction for Defendant's health insurance
contribution

for the children

that

is clearly

in the record

(TR2/101:17-21).
The Respondent

submitted

the Child Support

Schedule

after the case had been closed, using figures not in evidence and
without

foundation or basis.

As a result, the award should be

reversed.

12

D.

The Court

committed

reversible error in awarding

Respondent child support in the amount of $1,547,00 per month,
which subsequently increased to $1,638.00 on April 15, 1989.
1.

There was no competant evidence introduced to

support the child support increase.
The Appellant concedes that his income increased
significantly since the time of the divorce.
The Respondent goes far afield by advancing the
proposition that the child support worksheet is not evidentiary
and subject to the same foundational and other requirements of
the Rules of Evidence.
The issue is what dollar figure the Court should
have plugged into the child support worksheet to arrive at a
monthly child support amount and whether the child support
worksheet was admissable into evidence.
The authority

for Appellant's

objection

is

elementary.
Domestic hearings are subject to the Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 101 and Rule 1101
The worksheet is hearsay under Article VIII Rule
801(a) and (b).
The worksheet

contains a written amount that

purports to be the Appellant's net income as defined by the
Uniform Child Support Schedule instructions.
It was offered for the purpose of determining how
much child support the Appellant would pay.
13

There was no foundation offered as to where the
figure used by the Respondent came from.
It would appear that an income figure on a child
support

schedule wouldnot

come within the exceptions offered

under rule 803 or 901 Utah Rules of Evidence.
The Respondent
support

schedule

was

argues that a copy of the child

filed

prior

to

trial

attached

to a

memorandum as well as after the close of trial.
This position

is apparently in response to the

trial judge's position "...well, I suppose under the rules, he
can file those guideline worksheets any time you want to..."
(TR2/112:23-24).
What rules the judge refers to are unknown.
The

Respondent

filed

various

pleadings

which

contained prayers for child support.
March 22, 1985
March

$1,000.00 child support

6, 1986

900.00 child support

February 26, 1988 (Memorandum)

1,600.00 child support

September 15, 1988 (Memorandum)

1,858.14 child support

Attached

(Exhibit "A") is a copy of the schedule

attached to Respondent's September 15, 1988 Memorandum, which she
apparently refers to in her Brief as the one filed before trial,
which is different than the one filed after trial.
It was the one that was filed after trial, that
apparently is the one the trial court adopted.

14

Even the dollar figures used in Respondent's Brief
do not jive with the Amended Findings of Fact signed by the
Court.
Trial Exhibit No. 7, which is attached as Exhibit
"B" in Respondent's Brief, shows that Appellant earned $72,166.
Where the Court and the Respondent came up with
$120,000.00 per year is unknown and certainly not supported by
the record or even used in Respondent's child support worksheet
submitted after the trial ended.
Respondent argues in her brief that her part-time
income is $600.00 per month.

Finding No. 22 of the Amended

Findings of Fact indicate that the Plaintiff/Respondent had
adjusted gross, part-time income of $800.00 per month and that
Defendant/Appellant had adjusted gross income of $6,985.00 per
month.
Where the Respondent and Court deduced that figure
is similarly a puzzle.
The Uniform Guidelines require that the obligor
get a credit for health insurance.
There is unrefuted evidence that the Appellant
pays $375.00 per month in health insurance, which the Respondent
chose not to include in its worksheet (TR2/101:17-21)
The Court clearly erred in allowing the worksheet
to be submitted after trial while using it as the evidence that
it used to set child support.

15

The Court should have granted Appellant a directed
verdict after Respondent rested.
At the minimum, the Court should have set child
support

at $1,044.00 per month which was the only competant

evidence before the court (TR2/103:1-3).
The case of Naylor v. Naylor 700 P2d 707 (Utah
1985) does not help the Respondent because it is clear from the
Amended

Findings

that the Court was using

Support Schedule to set child support

the Uniform Child

(see Amended Findings No.

21, 22, 23, 24, and 25) .
E.

The Court erred in not granting Appellantfs Motion for

Directed Verdict.
For reason as outlined
Brief

and

this

Response,

the

in both Appellant's
Court

should

have

initial
granted

Appellant's post-judgment motion.

F.

The

Court

committed

reversible

error

in

awarding

Respondent Attorneyfs Fees.
Appellant

submits

that

he

is on sound

ground

in

requesting a reversal of the award to Respondent of Attorney's
fees.
Respondent's

only

argument

is that

the award

is

supported by judicial notice.
Nowhere does the record support a Finding that the
trial court took judicial notice of the elements that Respondent
was required to establish

Talley v. Talley 739 P2d 83 (Utah App
16

1987).
Article II Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence outline
the requisites for a judicially noticed fact.
First, they must be a fact generally known within the
territory and second, capable of accurate and ready determination
by a resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned.
The Rule further provides for an opportunity to be
heard.
In this case, there is nothing in the record to support
that the Court took judicial notice of respondent's attorneys1
fees.
Further, because of the elements that go into the
determination of attorney's fees, they are not items that are
susceptible to judicial notice and should be reversed.
G.

The Court should have found Respondent in contempt of

Court and either dismissed her case or awarded Appellant a new
trial.
After trial the Appellant discovered evidence that
alleged that the Respondent had kept a second bank account
without disclosing it, had purchased an interest in an airplane
for $4,500.00 without disclosing it, and all the while telling
the Court that she could not pay her mortgage or property taxes.
Further, the Respondent promptly bought a new home
after the trial and after she sent a bill to the mortgage holder
for some $19,000.00 she claimed she expended on the home that, at
17

trial, she claimed she had no money to repair.
The Respondent denies none of these facts in her Brief.
She

relies

on

the

trial

Judge's

response

that

he was

not

convinced.
It was an absolute abuse of discretion and travesty to
the judicial

system

in Utah not

to take some form of action

concerning these allegations.
At
evidentiary

the

very

hearing

least,

the Court

could

have

held

an

to investigate these charges and extended

Appellant thirty (30) days to complete his investigation.
H.

Judge Moffat should have been excused.
Attached is a copy of Appellant's Affidavit to Recuse

Judge Moffat.

Clearly it went further than Respondent asserts.

CONCLUSION
The trial court in this case grossly abused its discretion
in both evidentiary matter and matters of law.

As a result, the

case should be reversed and dismissed or a new trial should be
granted.
Further, Appellant should be awarded his cost and attorney's
fees incurred as a result of this appeal.
DATED this

7

day of January, 1

sfeKkG S. roV(5tfSEN
£ Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this _l
true and correct copy of the foregoing Respq
first class mail, postage pre-padPd to PI
attorney, Robert Hughes at: 1000 ^al^ey Towei
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

Foxley/BriefII
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January, 1990 a
e Was mailed via
f/Resondent!s
West Broadway,

IN THE

THTPFI

SALT LAKE

DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY

Plaintiff,

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY)

vs.

Civil NO.D82

1591

WILLIAM M. FOXLEY

Defendant.

Defendant

PJaJnlifi

AVAILABLE INCOME
Gross Monthly Income

U

Pre-Existing Alimony or Child Support
Orders You Have Paid

21

Adjusted Gross Income

3a 590

3b 8 , 3 3 3

4a

4b , 9 3

590.00

Combined

lb 8 , 3 3 3 . (+)

e

2b

9
3c 8 , 9 2 3 . 0 0

(#1a - #2a - #3a, #lb - #2b - #3b, #3i + #3b - #3c)

Proportionate Share of Combined Income

.07 <

*

(#3a - #3c - #4a, #3b - #3c - #4b)

CHILD SUPPORT NEED
Age Group
Number of Children per Age Group

0-6
5a 1

7-15
Sb 2

16-18
Sc

Sd 3

9

(#5a f #5b + #5c • #5d)
6b 710
6c 6
Schedule Amount per Child
6a 578
(use the combined adjusted gross income from #3c and the schedule appropriate to the
total number of children in #5d)
7dX-9-28.00
Total Amount
7a 578
7b 1420
7c 9
(#5a x #6a - #7a, #5b x #6b - #7b, #5c x #6c - #7c, #7a • #7b • #7c - #7d)

Work-Related Child Care Costs

8_L

Health and Dental Insurance Premiums For Children

9

»

101998.00

Total Support Need
(#7d • #8 • #9 - #10)

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
Share of Obligation

11a 1 3 9 . 0 0

llbl858.14

Credit for Actual Payments in #8 and #9

12a

12b

Parent's Total Child Support Obligation

13a 1 3 9 . 0 0

(#4a x #10 - #11a, #4b x #10 « #11b)

9

9

I3bl858.14

(#lla - #12a - #13a. #llb - #12b - #13b)

The extended visitation amount applies only to the non-custodial parent and to those
months in which the order specifies that the child spend at least 25 of 30 consecutive days
with that parent.
Amount Paid During Extended Visitation
(#13a x .75 - #14a, #13b x .75 - #14b)

14a_

A.

14b

J U L - 6 1989

ROBERT W. HUGHES (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)534-1074

SALT LAK; COU ; p v
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY t

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

/

Plaintiff,

)

CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

vs.
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY,

)

Defendant.

)

THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the
hour of 2:00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7, 1989
at

the hour of 10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify a

Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge
of

the

above-entitled

Court,

sitting

without

jury.

The

Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W. Hughes and
the Defendant, William

N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S.

Ericksen.
The Court having heard

testimony and received evidence,

argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises is now prepared to enter its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8,
1

1976.

At

the

time of

the marriage,

the Plaintiff

was an

undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at
Boise State University.
2.

The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree

of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August
23, 1983 to become final three months from the time of entry.
3.

At

the

time

of

the

divorce,

the

Plaintiff

was

unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and
had an income, not including amounts received from student loans,
of approximately $50.00 per month.
4.

That

at

the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff had

expenses of $1,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of
$895.00 per month.
5.

The Defendant

graduated

from the University of Utah

Medical School in June of 1983.
6.

During the parties marriage the parties had four minor

children to wit:

Christine, born September 19, 1970.

(Christine

was the daughter of the Plaintiff by a prior marriage who was
adopted by the Defendant

in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May

23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15,
1982.
Q

During the marriage, the Plaintiff could not pursue her

formal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at

2

various times during the marriage to assist in the support of the
family, and due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant for a
major portion of the time.
The parties acquired

few household

furnishings,

appliances or other personal property during the marriage.
8.

For approximately the two years after the parties were

divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required
and received public assistance.
9.

The Court

finds that

the Plaintiff

has done an

admirable job of caring for and educating the parties minor
children.
10.

The Court

finds that the Plaintiff and the minor

children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the
divorce.
11.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant

personal sacrifices to further her education since the time of
the divorce.

After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors

degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in
1989.

Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D.

completion

Length of time for

of this course of study will depend on course

requirements.
12.

The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in

an effort to maximize her income potential.

The testimony and

evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field
will be difficult without additional education and that aven with
3

additional education, employment opportunities are projected to
be limited in the future.
13.

During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-

time employee and had a gross income of $9,600.00.
14.

In 1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where

he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and
gynecology in that vicinity.
15.

During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant'

was able to provide a tax return, the Defendant had a gross
income of $128,437.00.

The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised

of wages he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately
6 months, at the Huerly Medical Center in Michigan, and from the
private practice of medicine.

The Defendant earned $112,406.00

from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of
practice.
16.

The earnincfs of the Defendant as well as his future

potential have been considered by the court for the purpose of
determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified.
17.

The Defendant's present income is not completely clear

but the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross income
can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year but
certainly

under

no circumstances

less than approximatelv

$120,000.00 per year.
18.

The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a

Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a
similar amov.nt to a retirement plan in 1988.
4

19.

The Court finds that there has been a substantial

change of circumstances in the parties income since the time of
the divorce.
20.

Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification

of the decree of divorce is warranted.

The Court does not,

however, find it necessary to invoke the theory of "Equitable
Restitution" as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is
it necessary to the Court to invoke the provisions of the
original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff and the
minor children are sufficient to justify a modification of the
decree.
21.

Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of

the children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be
increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the judicial
district's support guidelines.
22.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has an adjusted

gross part-time

income of $800.00 per month and that the

Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month.
23.

The proportionate share of the parties combined income

is 10% and 90% for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively.
24.

The Court finds that based upon the Plaintiff's and

Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the
5

minor children Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of
$504.00 for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total
child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor
children.

The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines,

should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,549.00 for child
support.

The Court further finds that the amount of child

support for Corinne should increase to the sum of $607.00 per
month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of
age on that date.

Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the

Defendant's child support obligation will increase to $1,638.00
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child.
25.

The Court further finds that pursuant to the support

guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25% during those periods which
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more
days with the minor child(ren).
26.

The Court finds that at the time of the hearing the

Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in
excess of $3,000.00 and that the Plaintiff's residence was in
jeopardy of being sold by the county for back property taxes;
that the Plaintiff is nine payments behind on her mortgage
payments; that the Plaintiff has incurred substantial debts for
medical, dental and orthodontic expenses for the children; that
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in
poor condition and is in need of substantial and major repairs,
including repairs to the roof, foundation, interior and exterior
6

walls and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home,
as well as other repairs; and, that the Plaintiff and the
children are in need of new appliances and household furnishings,
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also
new clothing and shoes.
The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as
when the Decree was entered.
27.

The Court finds that at the time of the modification

hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce.
28.

The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the

monthly alimony to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff
should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 per
month.

Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989.

29.

The Court further finds that the Defendant should be

required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor
children of the parties.

The Court further finds that it is

equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental insurance
should be divided equally between the parties.
30.

The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded

to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's
fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred
herein.
7

31.

The Court finds that that the Plaintiff's Counsel's

fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues,
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable.
32.
be

That the Court did not consider whether alimony should

terminated

but

would

entertain

further hearing

upon

application of either party or future petitions for modification.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has been a substantial change of circumstances

since the Decree of Divorce was originally entered in this
matter.
2.

It is fair and reasonable, based upon the change of

circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the
Defendant should be increased in accordance with the schedules
set forth in the child support guidelines.
3.

The child support to be paid by the Defendant to the

Plaintiff

for support of the parties minor children should

increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor
children.

The amount of child support

to be paid by the

Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor
children should be increased to the amount of $1,638.00 per
month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989.
4.

The Plaintiff has endured and continues to endure

significant and substantial hardships and has made significant
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she
8

has a significant and substantial need at present and in the
future for an increase in alimony.
5,

It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony

payable from the Defendant to the Plaintiff be increased to
$1,350.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989.
6,

The Defendant should provide health, accident and

dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the
parties.
7.

It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded

attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred

9

GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002
Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Ut 84010
Telephone:(801)295-6841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

}
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF GREG S. ERICKSEN

)

WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.

)

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

)

CIVIL NO. D82-1591

COMES NOW Greg S. Ericksen Attorney at Law who in support of
Defendant's motion to disqualify, and after being placed under
oath deposes and says as follows:
1.

That he is the Attorney of record for Defendant and is

familiar with this matter.
2.

That certain situations have arisen in phe matter and

that Defendant has the opinion that the Judge assigned to this
case has demonstrated a bias that would prevent him from having a
fair hearing and has directed me to seek another Judge to hear
issues involved herein.
3.

That the case at bar involves the following general

issues:
A.

Plaintiff

has

petitioned

the Court

for a

Modification of the Divorce Decree, requesting an
increase in child support and alimony.
B.

That Defendant

has asserted Plaintiff

CVUIOIT r~>

is in

contempt of court for willful refusal to allow him
visitation

of his children and

for

intentional

interference of his visitation rights.
4.

That at a prior hearing in this matter, Judge Richard

Moffat upon his own motion interviewed the children of the
Parties in camera and made a suggestion that Defendant was
largely responsible for visitation problems as he did not spend
time with his children and that if he didn't spend time, that the
Court may well limit his visitation.

Said remarks were made

without a full evidentiary hearing on the matter.
5.

That Defendant is a physician practicing medicine out

of state and has done so for the last six or seven years.
6.

That the crux of Defendant's pleadings and petitions to

find Plaintiff in contempt was that every year Defendant would
set aside time to visit his children due to the fact that he is a
physician and out of state.

Defendant alleges that every year

Plaintiff would willfuly refuse to let the children visit the
Defendant during this vacation time and that he would have to
petition the Court and that by the time he received the children
for visitation, his vacation period had run its course and that
visitation had to take place around a different schedule.
Further, Defendant has alleged and will offer testimony that
Plaintiff has withheld gifts and cards he has sent to this
children and has refused to let Defendant talk to his children by
phone when he calls.
7.

For this and other reasons, Defendant has filed a

petition requesting the Court to find Plaintiff in contempt for

intentional interference with visitation and interaction between
he and his children.
8.

That on June 6, 1988, Defendant sent a letter to

Plaintiff requesting visitation during July 11, 1988 through
August 15, 1988.
9.

That approximately three days prior to the designated

time for visitation, I received a call from Plaintifffs attorney
advising

me that unless Defendant

agreed

to shorten his

visitation to 3 weeks that Plaintiff would not let the children
go based on the fact that Judge Moffat had suggested that
visitation may be shortened if Defendant didn't agree to spend
more time with his children.
10.

That Dr. Foxley was again faced with not having his

vacation time to visit with his children.
11.

As a result, on July 11, 1988 at the hour of 1:00 p.m.,

the day set for visitation, counsel for Plaintiff and myself
placed a conference call to Judge Moffat regarding visitation.
12.

That

as I recall, the conversation, Judge Moffat

informed Plaintiff's counsel that he would not limit visitation,
but that if Defendant did not spend time with the children that
he may order them home.
13.

That the children left to visit with Defendant on or

about July 13, 1988, two days after visitation was to commence.
14.
during

That during the week of August 1, 1988 or approximately
that

time, I received

Plaintiff's counsel, requesting

a call

from Robert Hughes,

that the youngest child be

returned home because she was homesick.

15.

That

after

talking with Dr. Foxley,

I advised

Plaintiff's counsel that my client had advised me that things
were going great and that the only problem was that Plaintiff had
told the children that they only had to stay for three weeks and
that Plaintiff wanted the children to go to Montana with her
prior to the end of five weeks that Defendant had the children.
16.

That I was out of the state the week of August 8, 1988.

17.

That on or about August 9, 1988, I received a call from

my office informing me that Plaintiff's attorney was going to
have a hearing on August 10, 1988 to get a court order, ordering
the children immediately returned.
18.

That on August 9 and August 10, I tried to call

Plaintiff's counsel but could not reach him, whereupon I spoke
with Judge Moffat and registered my objection to such a hearing.
Judge Moffat informed me that he would not have time to hear such
a motion prior to his leaving for vacation on August 12, 1988,
and that he would not sign an order.
19.

On August 11, 1988, I was informed by toy office that

Plaintiff's counsel had called and that the Judge had agreed to
sign an order for immediate return of the children.
20.

Upon contacting Plaintiff's counsel, he confirmed what

my office had told me, whereupon I advised him that in my view
such an order was inappropriate and that I was shocked to learn
that Plaintiff and his client had visited with the Judge
concerning the matter.
I informed him that I intended to file an appeal.
21.

That I received a massage from my office that Judge

Moffat was upset and would find me personally in contempt and
wanted me in his office first thing Friday morning, August 12,
1988.
22.

That I unsuccessfully

tried

to reach the Judge and

informed his clerk that it was impossible for me to get back to
Salt Lake before Saturday, August 13.
23.

That

the following week of August 15, I spoke with

Plaintiff f s attorney who advised me that he was not going to
pursue the contempt issue.
I advised him that the children would be home on August 17,

:sss.
DATED this

fcl

day of September, 196d^

S. fffip-lcxsen
rorney for Defendant
The undersigned being a Notary Public does hereby certify
that on this
U&
day of September, 1988 personally appeared
before me GREG S. ERICKSEN, who executed the foregoing Affidavit.
LRY PUBLIC"
NOTARY

Residing at; lxu)& Ctx+tdu
My commission expires:

IN THE DISTRICT GCURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SAUT IAKE OOUNIY, STATE OF UTAH

Deanna F o x l e y

Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
William M. Foxley

CIVIL NO. DB2-1591

Defendant.

The Court having received the Amended Affidavit of Greg S. Ericksen the
attorney for the defendant in the above entitled matter and his Certificate
of Counsel all pursuant to rule 63B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
having considered same finds that the amended affidavit is insufficient in
law as well as in fact and declines to recuse himself fram the hearing in
the above entitled matter. The undersigned states that he in no way biased
or prejudiced for' or against either of the parties in said matter and feels
that the defendant has misunderstood some of the prDrojnoements of the Court
or seme of the rulings of the Court. In addition the problem that arose
regarriing the visitation during the first week of August, 1988, **iich ended
with an exparte order being granted has not been accurately reported to
defense counsel and his statements regarding the Ccurts attitude in regard

EXHIBIT D

(2)

to that matter are inaccairate.
Dated this ^O

day of September, 1988.

